GAO: $19 Billion Worth of Equipment ‘Lost’ in Iraq + DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces + Pentagon improperly sold F-14 parts

Dandelion Salad

From the NewsMax.com Staff
For the story behind the story…
Wednesday, Aug. 1, 2007 10:59 a.m. EDT
Associated Press

The Pentagon cannot fully account for $19.2 billion worth of equipment provided to Iraqi security forces, government auditors said Tuesday.

The finding by the Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of Congress, comes a few days after the Pentagon acknowledged that the U.S. and its allies have delivered a little more than a third of the equipment in the pipeline for the Iraqi Army and less than half of what is destined for the Iraqi police.

Baghdad officials have long complained that the lack of equipment has made it difficult to train and equip Iraqi forces.

Since the program’s beginning, the GAO found, consistent records confirming the date of issue, what type of equipment was received, and by what Iraqi unit were not kept. Before December 2005, no centralized records were kept. While the situation started improving in 2006, problems still exist, the GAO said.

“GAO’s review of the January 2007 property books found continuing problems with missing and incomplete records,” the report said.

The GAO found a discrepancy of at least 190,000 weapons between the data reported by the unit charged with implementing the program to train and equip Iraqi forces and the property books where such details are supposed to be kept.

The GAO says the Defense Department and components of the Multinational Force-Iraq were responsible.

In addition to the $19.2 billion used, the Defense Department recently requested another $2 billion for the program.

GAO recommended that accountability procedures be put in place, and that adequate staff and technology be made available for the program.

In a letter to the GAO, Mark Kimmitt, deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East, said he agrees with the recommendations.

“In view of the matters raised in the GAO report, DOD is reviewing policies and procedures to ensure U.S. funded equipment reaches the intended Iraqi Security Forces under the program,” Kimmitt said.

© 2007 Associated Press.
h/t: ICH
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DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07711.pdf
excerpts from GAO report

Highlights of GAO-07-711, a report to congressional committees

Why GAO Did This Study

Since 2003, the United States has provided about $19.2 billion to develop Iraqi security forces. DOD recently requested an additional $2 billion to continue this effort. Components of the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), including the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), are responsible for implementing the U.S. program to train and equip Iraqi forces. This report (1) examines the property accountability procedures DOD and MNF-I applied to the U.S. train-and-equip program for Iraq and (2) assesses whether DOD and MNF-I can account for the U.S.- funded equipment issued to the Iraqi security forces. To accomplish these objectives, GAO reviewed MNSTC-I property books as of January 2007 and interviewed current and former officials from DOD and MNF-I.

This report (1) examines the property accountability 3 procedures DOD and MNF-I applied to the U.S. train-and-equip program for Iraq and (2) assesses whether DOD and MNF-I can account for the U.S.-funded equipment issued to Iraqi security forces.

What GAO Found Results in Brief

As of July 2007, DOD and MNF-I had not specified which DOD accountability procedures, if any, apply to the train-and-equip program for Iraq. Congress funded the train-and-equip program for Iraq outside traditional security assistance programs, providing DOD a large degree of flexibility in managing the program, according to DOD officials. These officials stated that since the funding did not go through traditional security assistance programs, the DOD accountability requirements normally applicable to these programs did not apply.

Further, MNF-I does not currently have orders that comprehensively specify accountability procedures for equipment distributed to the Iraqi forces.

DOD and MNF-I cannot fully account for Iraqi forces’ receipt of U.S.-funded equipment. Two factors led to this lapse in accountability. First, MNSTC-I did not maintain a centralized record of all equipment distributed to Iraqi forces before December 2005. At that time, MNSTC-I established a property book system to track issuance of equipment to the Iraqi forces and attempted to recover past records. GAO found a discrepancy of at least 190,000 weapons between data reported by the former MNSTC-I commander and the property books. Former MNSTC-I officials stated that this lapse was due to insufficient staff and the lack of a fully operational distribution network, among other reasons.

Second, since the beginning of the program, MNSTC-I has not consistently collected supporting records confirming the dates the equipment was received, the quantities of equipment delivered, or the Iraqi units receiving the items. Since June 2006, the command has placed greater emphasis on collecting the supporting documents. However, GAO’s review of the January 2007 property books found continuing problems with missing and incomplete records. Further, the property books consist of extensive electronic spreadsheets, which are an inefficient management tool given the large amount of data and limited personnel to maintain the system.

[further, starting at the bottom of Page 1 of the report]

To accomplish these objectives, we reviewed documentation and interviewed current and former officials from DOD, MNF-I and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). We also analyzed MNSTC-I property book records as of January 2007. 4 We performed our work from March 2006 through July 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A detailed description of our scope and methodology is included in appendix I of this report. Because of broad-based congressional interest in this issue, we performed our work under the authority of the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct reviews on his own initiative. The work performed for this review has also contributed to several related GAO products on Iraq. 5

h/t: Malcolm

FAIR USE NOTICE: This blog may contain copyrighted material. Such material is made available for educational purposes, to advance understanding of human rights, democracy, scientific, moral, ethical, and social justice issues, etc. This constitutes a ‘fair use’ of any such copyrighted material as provided for in Title 17 U.S.C. section 107 of the US Copyright Law. This material is distributed without profit.

see:

GAO: Pentagon improperly sold F-14 parts

h/t: Malcolm